By: Luc Nadaud
Giant Sequoias, the Mighty Mississippi, and the Grand Tetons––even with their scale and celebrity, none of these icons, nor the like, can protect themselves. Our environment is harmed constantly, yet it can never sue for redress. Why? The answer is simple: even with such great stature, our natural world has no standing in court.
Many potential environmental lawsuits struggle with this problem. The party that has actually been harmed—whether a river choked with runoff or a forest cleared for a mine—cannot appear in court. Instead, someone else must step forward and claim that the ecosystem impact hurt them. If no one can reasonably claim so, then the case may never be heard at all.
The rights of nature doctrine solves this problem.
This doctrine recognizes that ecosystems like rivers, lakes, forests, and mountains are entitled to be rights-holders on their own.[1] Though once flippantly dismissed, rights of nature now has constitutional provisions, judicial decisions, and statutes to support it.[2] This blog argues that it deserves a place in the future of environmental law, not as a replacement for existing supports, but as a correction to a persistent weak point: standing.
The modern debate started in 1972, when Christopher Stone proposed giving rights to “the natural environment as a whole.”[3] His argument was not sentimental; rather, he recognized that law has repeatedly expanded the category of rights-holders. Indeed, it already lets representatives speak for those who cannot speak for themselves, such as children, the incapacitated, and corporations. Nature, Stone boldly suggested, can and should be represented in the same way.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court heard a version of this argument that same year, and rejected it. In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Court held that the Sierra Club lacked standing to challenge a proposed ski resort in Mineral King Valley because it had not sufficiently alleged an injury to itself.[4] Justice Douglas dissented, drawing on Stone’s article, and urged that natural objects be permitted to sue in their own names.[5] However, Douglas’s opinion lost the day, and the Court’s later cases further narrowed the path for meaningful environmental litigation.
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, several wildlife conservation groups sued the U.S. government over a rule saying federal agencies do not have to check whether construction projects in foreign countries will harm endangered animals.[6] The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had not established Article III standing; they did not show a concrete, particularized injury to themselves, traceable to the defendant and redressable by the court.[7] The result is a legal system where nature is protected only derivatively. That is, a polluted watershed gets its day in court if, and only if, another plaintiff can claim a sufficiently personal loss.
Rights of nature addresses this difficulty by redefining the “injury.” The ecosystem itself is the injured party, and humans act as its guardians.[8] A few international examples show this in practice.
Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution recognizes the rights of Earth to “maintain and generate its cycles, structure, functions, and evolutionary processes.”[9] And Ecuador’s legal system actually enforces these rights, as the government was recently forced to cease mining operations in the Los Cedros area due to its ecosystem impacts.[10] In New Zealand, the Te Awa Tupua Act of 2017 declares the Whanganui River as a legal person and designates guardians, one appointed by the Crown and one by the Whanganui iwi, to speak for it and protect it.[11] In Colombia, the Constitutional Court recognized the Atrato River as a rights-holder deserving of protection, conservation, maintenance, and restoration by the State.[12] These examples all share a scheme: defined rights, enforceable duties, and remedies aimed at restoring the ecosystem rather than compensating a human plaintiff.
To be frank, the United States’ record on rights of nature is mostly disappointing. In one instance, a federal court struck down Toledo’s Lake Erie Bill of Rights (an attempted application of rights of nature) as an overreach of municipal power and as unconstitutionally vague.[13] In another case, the State of Florida preempted local governments from granting rights of nature by statute.[14]
However, not all hope is lost. American law already extends some rights to natural entities,[15] and it is already widely acceptable to grant rights to another entity with no body nor voice: the corporation. As Christopher Stone explained, “We have become so accustomed to the idea of a corporation having ‘its’ own rights, and being a ‘person’ and ‘citizen’ for so many statutory and constitutional purposes, that we forget how jarring the notion was to early jurists.”[16] If we grant personhood rights to legal entities, why can’t we grant these same rights to natural entities?
Critics raise many objections to rights of nature doctrine, but each of these objections is easily answered. First, critics argue that nature has no interests and cannot speak. But corporations, estates, and infants also cannot speak for themselves—an issue the law routinely resolves by appointing representatives to advocate on their behalf.[17] Second, critics claim that the rights of nature doctrine is too vague to enforce. As discussed above, international examples show otherwise. Lastly, critics posit that existing environmental statutes suffice to protect nature. Granted, these statutes have their uses, but they protect nature through the lens of human interests and are often subject to agency discretion. Rights of nature recognizes something that existing statutes lack: nature’s right to stand for itself.
Long ago, Christopher Stone’s proposition looked like a dream that was unlikely to become a reality. Half a century later, several countries have adopted aspects of rights of nature doctrine in their constitutions, laws, and judicial decisions. Rights of nature will certainly not solve every problem in environmental law, and its pathway to recognition in the United States is uncertain, but it addresses a gap that existing law has not closed. Our environment deserves its day in court, and rights of nature provides that opportunity.
[1] Tiffany Challe, The Rights of Nature — Can an Ecosystem Bear Legal Rights?, Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (Apr. 22, 2022), https://lamont.columbia.edu/news/rights-nature-can-ecosystem-bear-legal-rights (on file with Tennessee Law Review).
[2] What Countries Grant Legal Rights to Nature and Why?, Earth.Org (Oct. 6, 2022) https://earth.org/nature-rights/ (on file with Tennessee Law Review).
[3] Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450, 456 (1972).
[4] Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41 (1972).
[5] Id. at 741–43 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
[6] See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
[7] See id. at 560–63.
[8] Stone, supra note 3, at 475.
[9] Earth.Org, supra note 2.
[10] Katie Surma, Ecuador’s High Court Affirms Constitutional Protections for the Rights of Nature in a Landmark Decision, Inside Climate News (Dec. 3, 2021), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/03122021/ecuador-rights-of-nature/ (on file with Tennessee Law Review).
[11] Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, s 14 (N.Z.).
[12] Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 10, 2016, Sentencia T-622/2016 (Colom.) https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2016/t-622-16.htm (on file with Tennessee Law Review).
[13] Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, 441 F. Supp. 3d 551, 558 (N.D. Ohio 2020).
[14] Fla. Stat. § 403.412(9) (2023).
[15] See Karen Bradshaw, Identifying Contemporary Rights of Nature in the United States, 95 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1439, 1457–60 (2022).
[16] Stone, supra note 3, at 452.
[17] Id. at 464.

